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By JEREMY BULOW AND KENNETH ROGOFF*
In recent years, economists have increasingly
debated whether multilateral development banks,
such as the World Bank, should switch from mak-
ing subsidized loans to giving outright grants. It is
no small question. The combined loans of the
World Bank Group and brethren regional entities
such as the Asian and Inter-American Develop-
ment Banks, approach $300 billion.
1 Their funds
constitute a main channel through which rich
country governments provide assistance to devel-
oping country governments.
In Bulow and Rogoff (1990), we ﬁrst devel-
oped the case for a shift to outright grants. We
argued that under the status quo, a vastly dis-
proportionate share of aid goes to middle in-
come countries via disguised interest subsidies,
rather than to the poorest countries. We also
argued that a shift to grants would protect donor
banks from sometimes having to play a “bad
cop” role when trying to collect net repayments
rather than fully rolling over loans. The “Melt-
zer Commission” (International Financial Insti-
tution Advisory Commission, 2000) report on
government sponsored international lending in-
stitutions famously took a similar view.
Supporters of the status quo often argue that
development bank loans to middle income
countries are in fact highly proﬁtable, and are
essential for allowing institutions like the World
Bank to subsidize aid to poor countries. We
shall argue that the Bank’s proﬁtability is an
accounting artiﬁce that greatly underestimates
the risks of the Bank’s portfolio.
Another argument for loans is that multilat-
eral development banks have a superior en-
forcement technology that helps international
debt markets to function more efﬁciently. Thus
loans allow ﬁnancially strapped governments,
including in middle-income countries, to bor-
row more than they could otherwise. We will
argue that this beneﬁt, too, is an illusion. In
those cases when ofﬁcial lending does expand a
developing country government’s borrowing
capacity, it effectively enables the government
to commit the country to repayment levels be-
yond that supported by domestic political con-
sensus, creating moral hazard for shortsighted
rulers. In theory, better credit access to ﬁnance,
say, public infrastructure projects can be highly
beneﬁcial. In practice, however, the increased
risk of debt crisis all too often outweighs any gain
ordinary citizens might enjoy from the loans.
Furthermore, moral hazard on the part of
lenders, who may be able to induce rich coun-
tries into subsidizing the bailout of troubled
middle-income borrowers, may mean that ag-
gregate lending is excessive even if multilater-
als merely displace equivalent private debt.
We do not argue for eliminating assistance to
middle-income countries. On the contrary, we
would favor expanding aid in general, albeit in
far greater proportion to the world’s poorest
countries. Note that in principle, any country
with market access could use grant ﬂows to help
defray interest rate costs on loans if it so chose,
but development banks would never need to
assume a “bad cop” role in enforcing debt.
I. Why Non-crisis Lending Does Not Add Value
We have already mentioned the two principal
rationales for loans: (1) Multilaterals claim to
have a superior debt enforcement capacity that
enables them to expand a country’s debt capacity,
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1 Using data from their most recent annual reports, total
loans outstanding for the largest multilateral development
banks include: International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development ($105 billion), the International Development
Agency ($70 billion—after taking out explicit grant com-
ponent), International Finance Corporation ($15 billion),
Inter-American Development Bank ($50 billion), the Asian
Development Bank ($25 billion), the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development ($8 billion), and the Af-
rican Development Bank ($8 billion). We exclude the $90
billion loaned by the International Monetary Fund in this
discussion, as the IMF’s stipulated role is to promote global
ﬁnancial stability rather than to provide long-term develop-
ment assistance, and it is not designed to be a development
bank. Note that most multilateral development bank loans
are government to government loans though a small per-
centage go to the private sector.
393and (2) The multilaterals’ middle-income coun-
try loan business has been a long-run money
maker, generating proﬁts that can be used to
help developing countries. A third rationale is
that by making large scale loans, development
banks are able to obtain far greater leverage
over developing country policies than they
would be able to with a steady small stream of
grants. Thus, loans are a way of leveraging the
donors’ inﬂuence over the country.
Setting aside the valuable technical assis-
tance that multilateral lenders can provide
(and which we would continue to ﬁnance with
grants), a great body of evidence suggests that
one should be extremely cautious in using an
external enforcement mechanism to expand
the borrowing capacity of a developing coun-
try whose own domestic institutions and gov-
ernance are too weak to support a high
volume of international debt. Countries with
weak institutions are prone to serial default,
often resulting in economic chaos and sus-
tained pauses in growth (see Carmen Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2004). Indeed, in Bulow and
Rogoff (1990), we argued more broadly that
rich country governments should also be cau-
tious in allowing their legal systems to be
used to enforce sovereign debts of countries
whose own legal institutions are too mallea-
ble or corrupt to offer foreign lenders mean-
ingful recourse in the event of default. Even
where corruption per se is not an issue, lead-
ers may face short-term pressures to borrow
maximally, ignoring heightened long-term
risks of a debt crisis. Just as aid is arguably
more effective in countries with good gover-
nance and strong institutions (e.g., Craig
Burnside and David Dollar, 2000), the same is
likely true for expanded debt capacity.
What about the argument that proﬁts on mul-
tilaterals’ middle-income country loan business
helps ﬁnance all the useful technical assistance
they provide? Whereas we do not dispute the
need for high quality technical assistance, one
has to question this ﬁnancing mechanism if
pre-crisis multilateral loans systematically ex-
acerbate the depth and severity of middle-
income country ﬁnancial crises. The tragic Ar-
gentine debt crisis of 2001 provides an illustra-
tion of this problem; the World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank lent billions
when Argentina’s government was overborrow-
ing during the 1990s.
In any event, it is highly debatable whether
multilateral lending banks actually do earn an
economic proﬁt. Bank accounting attributes lit-
tle risk to “hard money” development loans.
Some may argue that the multilaterals do face
only minimal risk on middle income country
loans, since rolling over troubled loans has thus
far avoided the need for large write-offs. But
recall that the U.S. federal deposit insurance
system also made a “proﬁt” on its premiums for
over ﬁfty years before losing well over $100
billion. There is no reason to believe that mul-
tilateral development banks will perpetually
avoid a similar fate.
A closer look at the balance sheet of the
World Bank’s main lending arm, the IBRD (In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment) helps illustrate the problem. The IBRD
reports a 29 percent equity to loans ratio and a
3 percent bad debt reserve, which would appear
to put it in rock solid ﬁnancial condition. These
ratios, however, value Bank loans at book
value, rather than at market value using private
debt prices. In mid-2003, the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce estimated that multilateral debt
was actually worth only 50 cents on the dollar,
under the assumption that, de facto if not de
jure, multilateral debt is only of equal priority
with loans from private lenders (see Douglas
Holz-Eakin, 2004). The CBO calculation admit-
tedly runs against the ofﬁcial line that multilat-
eral debt is senior, justifying the multilaterals’
practice of charging interest rates far below
those charged by private lenders. However, the
CBO’s calculations are quite consistent with
empirical tests of seniority presented in Bulow
et al. (1992), who ﬁnd they cannot reject the
hypothesis that multilateral debt is of equal pri-
ority to private debt. Under the assumption of
equal priority, the World Bank would have had
negative net worth at the end of 2004, even after
the sharp narrowing of risk spreads on develop-
ing country debt that took place during that
year.
If the World Bank really has negative net
worth, what then can explain the AAA market
rating the Bank gets on the bonds that it issues
to help ﬁnance its lending and technical assis-
tance activities? The answer is that the Bank has
a call on the capital of its rich shareholder
countries that provides private bondholders
with the equivalent of deposit insurance. In-
deed, the Bank carefully constrains its develop-
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limit, ensuring that its bond issuances never
exceed the sum of rich country callable capital
plus its liquid ﬁnancial assets (held mainly in
rich country securities). As Table 1 illustrates,
even if the Bank’s developing country loan
portfolio became worthless overnight, it would
still have $25 billion more in liquid assets and
guarantees than in debts.
Even if one ignores the obvious risks posed
by future defaults, the Bank’s proﬁts reported to
date may still be overstated, as indeed may be
its status as a creditor senior to private lenders.
In practice, countries that balk at repaying large
net debts to the World Bank are often coaxed
into doing so with the explicit or implicit prom-
ise of higher future bilateral loans, aid, or both.
Nancy Birdsall et al. (2003) and Bulow et al.
(1992) both ﬁnd evidence in favor of such webs
of sidepayments. A clear example is the current
use of grants and subsidized loans from other
ofﬁcial lenders to prevent default on the hard
money loans of the African Development Bank.
Finally, what of the argument that jumbo size
development loans give donors superior lever-
age to a subsidy-equivalent level of grants? No
doubt big loans do give donors more up front
leverage. Once the loans are committed, how-
ever, the Bank is often left with very little
leverage in future periods when funds are sup-
posed to be reﬂowing from the borrower. The
issues for other development banks are similar.
II. The Beneﬁts of Moving to Grants
We have already highlighted how grants give
much greater transparency by unbundling market
rate loans, grants or subsidies, and technical assis-
tance. Empirical estimates suggest that the subsi-
dies inherent in middle-income country loans are
potentially quite large (see Bulow et al., 1992).
With grants, any implicit loan subsidies would be
made explicit and, in principle, aid could be chan-
neled more fairly and efﬁciently.
Another reason for moving to grants is to
minimize “loan pushing.” Multilateral develop-
ment banks sometimes have their own internal
pressures to pump out loans, inducing politi-
cally fragile developing countries to take on
unwanted debt. This can happen for example,
when a multilateral offers to make a loan to a
state government, which will then politically
pressure the federal government into ratifying
and guaranteeing the multilateral’s “cheap”
debt.
Grants eliminate the needless tying of a
project’s ﬁnancing to the amount of subsidy
provided. At the end of 2004, China possessed
over $500 billion in reserves. If the World Bank
wishes to support new schools or hospitals why
should this only be possible if the Chinese agree
to borrow money?
The replacement of ofﬁcial loans with grants
will not eliminate the pressure to bail out private
creditors during debt crises, but at least the
nature of any such transaction will become
more transparent.
III. Transition and Financing
Given the status quo, how can one phase the
World Bank, or any of the regional develop-
ment banks, out of the lending business? There
are a number of possible schemes. We offer
below a highly plausible three-step plan for the
World Bank’s IBRD arm, which lends mainly
to middle-income countries. (The plan can eas-
ily be generalized to incorporate the Banks’
other lending arms as well.) Our approach
would both transition the IBRD out of loans and
provide a ﬁrm foundation for future grant
disbursements:
(1) No new loans to developing countries.—At
present, ninety percent of the face value of
IBRD debt is scheduled to come due within
ten years. The Bank could reschedule or write
down loans as needed, but any cash transfers
to a country would be in the form of grants.
(2) No new borrowing by the Bank in private
capital markets.—It should be possible to
pay off the Bank’s existing bonds out of its
existing rich country ﬁnancial assets and
the future stream of developing country
loan repayments. If necessary (if developing
TABLE 1—WHY WORLD BANK’S IBRD BONDS ARE AAA
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
World Bank Net Worth 35
 Rich Country Callable Capital 104
 Illiquid and Physical Assets 6
 Book Value of Loan Portfolio and Guarantees 108
 Safety Margin for Creditors if Loans are
worth zero
25
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ofﬁcial book value despite the Banks’ “se-
nior” status), these funds could be supple-
mented by the new funding discussed
below in (3).
(3) Replace callable capital with paid-in
endowments.—Rich countries would de-
posit amounts equal to their callable capital.
These claims would be forgiven and con-
verted to endowment over 20 years. A rich
country would only be allowed to withdraw
a deposit with the voting approval of 80
percent of all depositors, weighted by
World Bank ownership share.
The purpose of (1) is to ensure a smooth
transition to a grant system, while not forcing
the Bank to sell any of its interest in debt claims
it may regard as senior but that the market may
regard as less valuable.
While (1) would reduce the Bank’s undiver-
siﬁed exposure to middle-income developing
country credit risk, (2) would further reduce risk
by de-leveraging the “World Bank Hedge
Fund” (see Table 2).
The goal of proposal (3) is to strengthen the
Bank’s endowment for providing future grants
and technical assistance. Indeed, when combined
with the elimination of further borrowing, the new
ﬁnancial structure of the World Bank would ulti-
mately be similar to that of a private $100 billion
foundation, the exact value depending on its suc-
cess in collecting its preexisting loans. Note that
the above plan would share the burden of ﬁnanc-
ing the new grant agency between developing
countries, some of whom would be making loan
repayments, and rich countries, who would be
donating additional endowment funds.
IV. Conclusions
The long-standing practice of bundling loans
into multilateral development assistance is an
anachronism that no longer makes sense in to-
day’s highly liquid capital markets, particularly in
the case of middle-income (emerging market)
countries. In cases where multilateral loans sig-
niﬁcantly expand chronic defaulting countries’
borrowing capacities, they may well be counter-
productive. Stronger international enforcement of
developing country loans largely encourages
greater borrowing by exactly those kinds of
weakly governed states for whom expanded bor-
rowing is least likely to be productive, and most
likely to lead to debt crises. Even if ofﬁcial lend-
ing mainly crowds out private lending, bundling
aid in the form of subsidized loans makes aid
ﬂows highly non-transparent. This opacity poten-
tially distorts the pattern of aid ﬂows across coun-
tries, with middle-income countries receiving a
much larger share of total multilateral develop-
ment aid than is commonly realized. We reject
various standard arguments for preferring loans to
grants, such as needing to have big programs to
induce borrower compliance. We offer a relatively
simple and practical mechanism for achieving a
transition from loans to grants. Our proposal is
designed to be market friendly and to put funding
for multilaterals’ future grant and technical assis-
tance activities on a ﬁrm and predictable basis.
We have focused on multilateral development
bank loans but most of our analysis applies with
even greater force to the broad universe of bilat-
eral ofﬁcial lenders, who collectively have more
than $450 billion in loans outstanding, 50 percent
more than the multilateral development banks.
Bilateral loans share all the problems of multilat-
eral loans, plus they typically attach strings that
siphon off resources to favored rich country in-
dustries. Nevertheless, the case for shifting to a
grants-only multilateral regime seems compelling
regardless of how quickly the individual countries
guide their bilateral lending arms to move in the
same direction.
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